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What Do You Think Would Make You Happier?
What Do You Think You Would Choose?†
By Daniel J. Benjamin, Ori Heffetz,
Miles S. Kimball, and Alex Rees-Jones*
Would people choose what they think would maximize their subjective
well-being (SWB)? We present survey respondents with hypothetical
scenarios and elicit both choice and predicted SWB rankings of
two alternatives. While choice and predicted SWB rankings usually
coincide in our data, we find systematic reversals. We identify
factors—such as predicted sense of purpose, control over one’s life,
family happiness, and social status—that help explain hypothetical
choice controlling for predicted SWB. We explore how our findings
vary by SWB measure and by scenario. Our results have implications
regarding the use of SWB survey questions as a proxy for utility. (JEL
D03, I31)
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole
these days?
Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you
say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?
Much of the time during the past week, you felt you were happy. Would you
say yes or no?1
* Benjamin: Department of Economics, Cornell University, 480 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853 and National Bureau
of Economic Research (e-mail: db468@cornell.edu); Heffetz: S. C. Johnson Graduate School of Management,
Cornell University, 324 Sage Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853 (e-mail: oh33@cornell.edu); Kimball: Department of
Economics, University of Michigan, 312 Lorch Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 and National Bureau of Economic
Research (e-mail: mkimball@umich.edu); Rees-Jones: Department of Economics, Cornell University, 445 Uris
Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853 (e-mail: arr34@cornell.edu). A previous version of this paper circulated under the title
“Do People Seek to Maximize Happiness? Evidence from New Surveys.” We are extremely grateful to Dr. Robert
Rees-Jones and his office staff for generously allowing us to survey their patients and to Cornell’s Survey Research
Institute for allowing us to put questions in the 2009 Cornell National Social Survey. We thank Gregory Besharov,
John Ham, Benjamin Ho, Erzo F. P. Luttmer, Michael McBride, Ted O’Donoghue, Matthew Rabin, Antonio Rangel,
and Robert J. Willis for especially valuable early comments and suggestions, as well as four anonymous referees
for suggestions that substantially improved the paper. We are grateful to participants at the CSIP Workshop on
Happiness and the Economy, the NBER Summer Institute, the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE),
the Lausanne Workshop on Redistribution and Well-Being, the Cornell Behavioral/Experimental Lab Meetings, and
seminar audiences at Cornell, Deakin, Syracuse, Wharton, Florida State, Bristol, Warwick, Dartmouth, Berkeley,
Princeton, Penn, RAND, and East Anglia for helpful comments. We thank Eric Bastine, Colin Chan, J.R. Cho,
Kristen Cooper, Isabel Fay, John Farragut, Geoffrey Fisher, Sean Garborg, Arjun Gokhale, Jesse Gould, Kailash
Gupta, Han Jiang, Justin Kang, June Kim, Nathan McMahon, Elliot Mandell, Cameron McConkey, Greg Muenzen,
Desmond Ong, Mihir Patel, John Schemitsch, Brian Scott, Abhishek Shah, James Sherman, Dennis Shiraev,
Elizabeth Traux, Charles Whittaker, Brehnen Wong, Meng Xue, and Muxin Yu for their research assistance. We
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†
To view additional materials, visit the article page at http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.5.2083.
1
The first of these three questions is from the World Values Survey; similar questions appear in the EuroBarometer Survey, the European Social Survey, the German Socioeconomic Panel, and the Japanese Life in Nation
survey. The second question is from the US General Social Survey; similar questions appear in the Euro-Barometer
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Economists increasingly use survey-based measures of subjective well-being
(SWB) as an empirical proxy for utility. In many applications, SWB data are used
for testing or estimating preference models, or for conducting welfare evaluations,
in situations where these are difficult to do credibly with choice-based revealedpreference methods. Examples include estimating the negative externality from
neighbors’ higher earnings (Luttmer 2005), individuals’ trade-off between inflation and unemployment (Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003), and the effect
of health status on the marginal utility of consumption (Finkelstein, Luttmer, and
Notowidigdo forthcoming). Such work often points out that in addition to being
readily available where choice-based methods might not be, SWB-based proxies
avoid the concern that choices may reflect systematically biased beliefs about their
consequences (e.g., Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003; Gilbert 2006).
It hence interprets SWB data as revealing what people would choose if they were
well informed about the consequences of their choices for SWB, and uses SWB
measures to proxy for utility under the assumption that people make the choices
they think would maximize their SWB. This paper provides evidence for evaluating that assumption.
We pose a variety of hypothetical decision scenarios to three respondent populations: a convenience sample of 1,066 adults, a representative sample of 1,000 adult
Americans, and 633 students. Each scenario has two alternatives. For example, one
scenario describes a choice between a job that pays less but allows more sleep versus a job with higher pay and less sleep. We ask respondents which alternative they
think they would choose. We also ask them under which alternative they anticipate
greater SWB; we assess this “predicted SWB” using measures based on each of the
three commonly used SWB questions posed in the epigraph above. We test whether
these two rankings coincide.2 To the extent that they do not, we attempt to identify—by eliciting predictions about other consequences of the choice alternatives—
what else besides predicted SWB explains respondents’ hypothetical choices, and to
quantify the relative contribution of predicted SWB and other factors in explaining
these choices.
In designing our surveys, we made two methodological decisions that merit discussion. First, while the purpose of our paper is to help relate choice behavior to
SWB measures, those measures are based on reports of respondents’ general levels of realized SWB, whereas our survey questions elicit respondents’ predictions
comparing the SWB consequences of specific choices. To compare SWB rankings
with choice rankings under the same information set and beliefs, however, we must
measure predictions about SWB, because it is only predictions that are available at
the moment of choice. Moreover, to link SWB with choice, we must focus on the
SWB consequences of specific choices.

survey, the National Survey of Families and Households, and the World Values Survey. The third question is from
the University of Michigan’s Surveys of Consumers; similar questions appear in the Center of Epidemiologic
Studies Depression Scale, the Health and Retirement Study, and the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index.
2
In the terminology of Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997), our work can be viewed as comparing “decision utility” (what people choose) with “predicted utility” (what people predict will make them happier). We
avoid these terms, however, because our “decisions” are hypothetical; and because we ask respondents to
predict their responses to common SWB survey questions, rather than the integral over time of their momentby-moment affect.
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Second, while economists generally prefer data on incentivized choices, our
choice data consist of responses to questions about predicted choice in hypothetical
scenarios. This is a limitation of our approach, because the two may not be the same.3
However, using hypothetical scenarios allows us to address a much wider variety of
relevant real-world choice situations. It also allows us to have closely comparable
survey measures of choice and SWB.4 For brevity, hereafter we will sometimes omit
the modifiers “predicted” and “hypothetical” when the context makes it clear that by
“choice” and “SWB” we refer to our survey questions.
We have two main results. First, we find that overall, respondents’ SWB predictions are a powerful predictor of their choices. On average, SWB and choice coincide 83 percent of the time in our data. We find that the strength of this relationship
varies across choice situations, subject populations, survey methods, questionnaire
structure variations, and measures of SWB, with coincidence ranging from well
below 50 percent to above 95 percent.
Our second main result is that discrepancies between choice and SWB rankings
are systematic. Moreover, we can identify other factors that help explain respondents’ choices. As mentioned above, in addition to eliciting participants’ choices and
predicted SWB, in some surveys we also elicit their predictions regarding particular
aspects of life other than their own SWB. The aspects that systematically contribute
most to explaining choice, controlling for own SWB, are sense of purpose, control
over life, family happiness, and social status. At the same time, and in line with our
first main result above, when we compare the predictive power of own SWB to that
of the other factors we measure, we find that across our scenarios, populations, and
methods, it is by far the single best predictor of choice.
We use a variety of survey versions and empirical approaches in order to test the
robustness of our main results to alternative interpretations. For example, while most
of our data are gathered by eliciting both choice and predicted SWB rankings from
each respondent, in some of our survey variations we elicit the two rankings far apart
in the survey, or we elicit only choice rankings from some participants and only SWB
rankings from others. As another example, we assess the impact of measurement
error by administering the same survey twice (weeks or months apart) to some of our
respondents. While these different approaches affect our point estimates and, hence,
the relative importance of our two main results, both results appear to be robust.
As steps toward providing practical, measure-specific and situation-specific
guidance to empirical researchers as to when the assumption that people’s choices
maximize their predicted SWB is a better or worse approximation, we analyze
how our results differ across SWB measures and across scenarios. Comparing
SWB measures, we find that in our data, a “life satisfaction” measure (modeled
after the first question in the epigraph) is a better predictor of choice than either
of two “happiness” measures (modeled after the second and third questions in
3
Although economists generally prefer data on incentivized choices, in some situations self-reports may be more
informative about preferences, e.g., when temptation, social pressure, or family bargaining might distort real-world
choices away from preferences. (As we mention below, our data are silent on which method best elicits preferences.)
4
The advantage in having closely comparable (survey-based) measures is that when we find discrepancies
between choice responses and SWB responses, these discrepancies can be attributed wholly to differences in question content rather than at least partially to differences in how respondents react to the perceived realness of the
consequences of their response.
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the epigraph) that perform similarly to each other. Comparing scenarios, we find
that in scenarios constructed to resemble what our student respondents judge as
representative of important decisions in their lives, predicted SWB coincides least
often with choice, and other factors add relatively more explanatory power. We
also find that in scenarios where one alternative offers more money, respondents
are systematically more likely to choose the money alternative than they are likely
to predict it will yield higher SWB. Under some conditions, this last finding suggests that the increasingly common method of valuing nonmarket goods by comparing the coefficients from a regression of SWB on income and on the amount
of a good5 systematically estimates a higher value than incentivized choice–based
methods of eliciting willingness-to-pay (since the weight of money in predicted
SWB understates its weight in choice).
Much previous research has studied the relationship between choice and happiness.6 Our work is most closely related to experiments reported in Tversky and
Griffin (2000); Hsee (1999); and Hsee et al. (2003) that use methods similar to
some of ours.7 However, because our goal is to provide guidance for interpreting
results from the empirical economics literature, our paper differs from these prior
papers in two fundamental ways. First, both our scenarios and our SWB measures
are tailored to be closely relevant to the economics literature. Thus, rather than
primarily focusing on narrow affective reactions to specific consumption experiences (e.g., the “enjoyment” of a sound system), as in Hsee (1999) and Hsee et
al. (2003), we purposefully model our measures on the SWB questions asked in
large-scale social surveys, and we focus on a range of scenarios that we designed
to be relevant to empirical work in economics as well as scenarios that are judged
by our respondents to represent important decisions in their lives. Second, crucially, we elicit predictions about other valued aspects of the choice alternatives.
Indeed, it has often been observed that factors beyond one’s own happiness (in
the narrow sense measured by standard survey measures) may matter for choice.8
As far as we are aware, however, our work is the first to quantitatively estimate
the relative contribution of predicted SWB and these other factors in explaining
choice.
5
Recent examples have valued deaths in one’s family (Deaton, Fortson, and Tortora 2010), the social costs of
terrorism (Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer 2009), and the social cost of floods (Luechinger and Raschky 2009).
6
In a spirit similar to ours, Becker and Rayo (2008) propose (but do not pursue) empirical tests of whether things
other than happiness matter for preferences in empirically relevant choice situations. Relatedly, Perez-Truglia
(2010) tests empirically whether the utility function inferred from consumption choices is distinguishable from the
estimated happiness function over consumption. In contrast to our approach, these tests and their interpretation are
affected by whether individuals correctly predict the SWB consequences of their choices.
Our work is also related to a literature in philosophy that poses thought experiments in hypothetical scenarios in
order to demonstrate that people’s preferences encompass more than their own happiness (e.g., Nozick 1974), but
that literature focuses on extreme situations, such as being hooked up to a machine that guarantees happiness, and
focuses on an abstract conception of happiness that is broader than empirical measures.
7
These papers find discrepancies between choice and predicted affective reactions, in hypothetical scenarios
carefully designed to test theories about why the two may differ. Tversky and Griffin (2000) theorize that payoff
levels are weighted more heavily in choice, while contrasts between payoffs and a reference point are weighted
more heavily in happiness judgments. Hsee (1999) and Hsee et al. (2003) theorize that when making choices,
individuals engage in “lay rationalism,” i.e., they mistakenly put too little weight on anticipated affect and too much
weight on “rationalistic” factors that include payoff levels as well as quantitatively measured attributes. Our finding that factors other than SWB help predict choice provides a different possible perspective on the evidence from
these earlier papers.
8
For a few recent examples, see Diener and Scollon (2003); Loewenstein and Ubel (2008); Hsee, Hastie, and
Chen (2008); and Fleurbaey (2009).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the survey
design and subject populations. Section II asks whether participants choose the
alternative in our decision scenarios that they predict will generate greater SWB.
Section III asks whether aspects of life other than SWB help predict choice, controlling for SWB, and compares the relative predictive power of the factors that
matter for choice. Section IV presents robustness analyses. Section V characterizes
the heterogeneity in choice-SWB concordance across SWB measures, scenarios,
and respondent characteristics. Section VI concludes and discusses other possible
applications of our methodology and implications of our findings. For example,
while our paper focuses on testing measures that are based on existing SWB survey
questions, our methodology can be used to explore whether alternative, novel questions could better explain choice. And while our data cannot inform us regarding
the best way to elicit preferences, if one assumes that hypothetical choices reveal
preferences, then our findings may imply that individuals do not exclusively seek to
maximize SWB as currently measured. The online Appendix (available at the journal website) lists our decision scenarios. For longer discussions, as well as detailed
information on all survey instruments, pilots, robustness analyses, and additional
results, see our working paper, Benjamin et al. (2010) with its online Appendix
(hereafter BHKR).
I. Survey Design

While our main evidence is based on 29 different survey versions, they all share
a similar core that consists of a sequence of hypothetical pairwise-choice scenarios. To illustrate, our ‘Scenario 1’ highlights a trade-off between sleep and income.
Followed by its SWB and choice questions, it appears on one of our questionnaires
as follows:
Say you have to decide between two new jobs. The jobs are exactly the
same in almost every way but have different work hours and pay different
amounts.
Option 1: A job paying $80,000 per year. The hours for this job are reasonable, and you would be able to get about 7.5 hours of sleep on the
average work night.
Option 2: A job paying $140,000 per year. However, this job requires
you to go to work at unusual hours, and you would only be able to sleep
around 6 hours on the average work night.
Between these two options, taking all things together, which do you think
would give you a happier life as a whole?

Option 1:
Sleep more but earn less
Definitely
Probably
Possibly
happier
happier
happier
X

X

X

Option 2:
Sleep less but earn more
Possibly
Probably
Definitely
happier
happier
happier
X

Please circle one X in the line above

X

X
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If you were limited to these two options, which do you think you would choose?
Option 1:
Sleep more but earn less
Definitely
Probably
Possibly
choose
choose
choose
X

X

X

Option 2:
Sleep less but earn more
Possibly
Probably
Definitely
choose
choose
choose
X

X

X

Please circle one X in the line above

In within-subject questionnaires, respondents are asked both the SWB question
and the choice question above. In between-subjects questionnaires, respondents are
asked only one of the two questions.
A. Populations and Studies
We conducted surveys among 2,699 respondents from three populations: 1,066
patients at a doctor’s waiting room in Denver who participated voluntarily; 1,000
adults who participated by telephone in the 2009 Cornell National Social Survey
(CNSS) and form a nationally representative sample;9 and 633 Cornell students who
were recruited on campus and participated for pay or for course credit. The Denver
and Cornell studies include both within-subject and between-subjects survey variants, while the CNSS study is exclusively within subject.
Table 1 summarizes the design details of these studies. It lists each study’s
respondent population, sample size, scenarios used (see Section IB below), types
of questions asked (see Section IC below), and other details such as response
scales, scenario order, and question order.10 The rest of this section explains the
details summarized in the table.
B. Scenarios
Our full set of 13 scenarios is given in the online Appendix. Table 1 reports which
scenarios are used in which studies, and in what order they appear on different questionnaires. As detailed in the online Appendix, some scenarios are asked in different
versions (e.g., different wording, different quantities of money, etc.) and some scenarios are tailored to different respondent populations (e.g., while we ask students
about school, we ask older respondents about work). In constructing the scenarios,
we were guided by four considerations.
First, we chose scenarios that highlight trade-offs between options that the literature suggests might be important determinants of SWB. Hence, respondents face
choices between jobs and housing options that are more attractive financially versus
ones that allow for: in Scenario 1, more sleep (Kahneman et al. 2004; Kelly 2004);
in Scenario 12, a shorter commute (Stutzer and Frey 2008); in 13, being around
9
The CNSS is an annual survey conducted by Cornell University’s Survey Research Institute. For details: https://
sri.cornell.edu/SRI/cnss.cfm.
10
The median age in our Denver, CNSS, and Cornell samples is, respectively, 47, 49, and 21; the share of female
respondents is 76, 53, and 60 percent. For summary statistics, see BHKR Table A3.
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Table 1—Study-Specific Information
Denver
Choice versus SWB: Withinor between-subjects design
Sample population
Observations
Scenarios used

Within

Between

Volunteers at a
doctor’s waiting room
497
569
1, 3, 4,
11, 12, 13

1, 2, 3, 4 (v2),
12 (v2), 13

Observations for each SWB question format:
(i) Life satisfaction
164
(isolated)
(ii) Happiness with life as a whole
162
(isolated)
(iii) Felt happiness
171
(isolated)
(iv) Own happiness with life as a
whole
isolated
First/last in series
(v) Immediately felt own happiness
isolated
First/last in series
SWB response scale
Choice response scale
Metachoice question
Order variations:
Scenario order
Question order
Aspects of life order
Summary: number of
questionnaire versions

CNSS

Within

Between

Nationally
representative
1,000

Cornell students
432a
201

1

1–10 (with v2
for scenario 4)

569
1,000

107
107

201

110
108
6-point
6-point

Yes

Within

Cornell

Binary
Binary
No

No

7-point
6-point
Yes

No

4-1-11-12-13-3 1-2-12-13-3-4
1
1-2- … -9-10
3-13-12-11-1-4 3-13-12-2-1-4b
Choice-meta-SWB
SWB-choice Choice-SWB
SWB-choice-meta
Two opposite orderings
of aspects
12
4
1
8
4

Notes: See Section I for the framing of the choice, SWB, and meta-choice questions. See the online Appendix for
a full description of each scenario. The scenarios corresponding to the scenario-numbers above are: (1) sleep versus income, (2) concert versus birthday, (3) absolute income versus relative income, (4) legacy versus income, (5)
apple versus orange, (6) money versus time, (7) socialize versus sleep, (8) family versus money, (9) education versus social life, (10) interest versus career, (11) concert versus duty, (12) low rent versus short commute, (13) friends
versus income.
a
Of these, 230 were surveyed twice, allowing us to conduct measurement error–corrected estimation.
b
Scenario 4 is always presented last because it is followed by both a choice and a SWB question. In order to have
a clean between-subjects design, we did not want subjects to know we were interested in both choice and SWB until
after subjects were done with the rest of the scenarios. We also note that this scenario is presented in four different order-versions, so strictly speaking, the Denver between-subjects study includes the four questionnaire versions
reported in the table’s bottom row, times four (16 versions in total).

friends (Kahneman et al. 2004); and in 3, making more money relative to others
(Luttmer 2005; see Heffetz and Frank 2011, for a survey).
Second, since some of us were initially unsure we would find any divergences
between predicted choice and SWB, in our earlier surveys we focused on choice
situations where one’s SWB may not be the only consideration. Hence, in Scenario
4 respondents choose between a career path that promises an “easier” life with fewer
sacrifices versus one that promises posthumous impact and fame, and in Scenarios 2
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and 11 they choose between a more convenient or “fun” option versus an option that
might be considered “the right thing to do.”
Third, once we found divergences between predicted SWB and choice, in our later
surveys (the Cornell studies) we wanted to assess the magnitude of these divergences
in scenarios that are representative of important decisions faced by our respondent
population. For this purpose we asked a sample of students to list the three top decisions they made in the last day, month, two years, and in their whole lives.11 Naturally,
decisions that were frequently mentioned by respondents revolved around studying,
working, socializing and sleeping. Hence, in the resulting Scenarios 7–10, individuals
have to choose between socializing and fun versus sleep and schoolwork; traveling
home for Thanksgiving versus saving the airfare money; attending a more fun and
social college versus a highly selective one; and following one’s passion versus pursuing a more practical career path. To these scenarios we added Scenario 6, which
involves a time-versus-money trade-off tailored for a student population.
Fourth, as an informal check on our methods, we wanted to have one falsificationtest scenario where we expected a respondent’s choice and SWB ratings to coincide. For this purpose, we added Scenario 5, in which respondents face a choice
between two food items (apple versus orange) that are offered free and for immediate consumption. Since we carefully attempted to avoid any non-SWB differences
between the options, we hypothesized that in this scenario, predicted SWB would
most strongly predict choice. This scenario has the additional attraction of being
similar to prevalent decisions in almost everyone’s life, which is our third consideration above.
C. Main Questions
Choice Question.—In all studies, for each scenario, the choice question is worded
as in our example above. In our analysis, we convert the horizontal six-point
response scale into an intensity-of-choice variable, ranging from 1 to 6, or into a
binary choice variable. CNSS responses are elicited as binary choices.12
SWB Question.—While the choice question is always kept the same, we vary
the SWB question in order to examine how choice relates to several different SWB
measures. In our Denver within-subject study we ask three versions of the SWB
question, modeled after what we view as three “families” of SWB questions that are
commonly used in the literature (see examples in the epigraph):
(i) Life satisfaction: “Between these two options, which do you think would
make you more satisfied with life, all things considered?”;
(ii) Happiness with life as a whole: “Between these two options, taking all things
together, which do you think would give you a happier life as a whole?”; and

11
The sample included 102 University of Chicago students; results were subsequently supported by surveying
another 171 Cornell students. See BHKR for details and classification of responses.
12
CNSS responses are elicited as binary because in telephone interviews the binary format is both briefer for
interviewers to convey and easier for respondents to understand.
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(iii) Felt happiness: “Between these two options, during a typical week, which do
you think would make you feel happier?”
As in the example above, there are six possible answers, which we convert into
either a six-point variable or a binary variable.
In the CNSS study, where design constraints limited us to one version of the SWB
question, we ask only version (ii). As with the choice question, response is binary.
As described shortly, in our Cornell studies we ask respondents about 12 different
aspects of life, of which (one’s own) happiness is only one. In those studies we use
versions of (ii) and (iii) that are modified to remain meaningful, with fixed wording,
across aspects. The modified (ii) and (iii) result in these two new versions:
(iv) Own happiness with life as a whole: “Between these two options, taking all
things together, which option do you think would make your life as a whole
better in terms of … [your own happiness]”; and
(v) Immediately-felt own happiness: “Between these two options, in the few
minutes immediately after making the choice, which option do you think
would make you feel better in terms of … [your own happiness].”13
The modified response scale now includes a middle “no difference” response, and has
seven possible answers (Option 1 definitely better; Option 1 probably better; Option 1
possibly better; no difference; Option 2 possibly better, etc.). We allow respondents to
indicate “no difference” because we anticipated that in some of the scenarios, it would
make little sense to force respondents to predict that all aspects would differ across the
two options (e.g., “sense of purpose” in Scenario 5, “apple versus orange”).
On the spectrum from more cognitive, evaluative SWB measures to more affective,
hedonic ones (e.g., Diener et al. 2009), we view version (i) as the most evaluative,
versions (iii) and (v) as the most affective, and versions (ii) and (iv) as intermediate.
Other Questions.—For completeness, we briefly mention, first, that in all questionnaires of the Denver and Cornell within-subject studies, the choice question is
followed by what we refer to as a meta-choice question: “If you were limited to
these two options, which would you want yourself to choose?” Also, recall that the
SWB question in all Cornell studies is modified to elicit rankings of the two scenario
options in terms of 11 additional aspects of life as well as “own happiness.” For
example, in versions (iv) and (v) of the SWB question, [your own happiness] may be
followed by [your family’s happiness], [your health], [your romantic life], etc.14 We
discuss these additional questions and the data they yield in later sections.

13
Since our between-subject tests have less statistical power than our within-subject tests, we ask only version
(i) in our Denver between-subjects surveys and only version (iv) in our Cornell between-subjects surveys.
14
In some questionnaire versions, we separate “own happiness” from the other 11 aspects and ask respondents first
only about own happiness in each scenario, and then, re-presenting the scenarios, we ask about the other aspects. In
these versions, we refer to the question on own happiness as an “isolated” measure of SWB (see Table 1). In other versions, where the 12 aspects appear together, we refer to the own happiness question as a “first/last in series” measure.
When own happiness is “first in series,” the 12 aspects appear together in the order they are listed as regressors in
Table 3 below. When own happiness is “last in series,” the 12 aspects appear together in reverse order.
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II. Do People Respond to the Choice and SWB Questions in the Same Way?

In this section we look at respondents’ binary ranking of Option 1 versus Option 2
in terms of hypothetical choice compared with their binary ranking in terms of predicted SWB.
A. Within-Subject Results
Table 2 reports the distribution of binary responses to our within-subject surveys’
choice and SWB questions by study and scenario, along with p-value statistics from
equality-of-proportions tests. The table pools responses across SWB question variants (see Section IC and Table 1 above); we discuss results by specific SWB measure below.15
The left-most column in the top section of the table reports Scenario 1 figures from
the Denver within-subject questionnaires (our “sleep versus income” scenario from
the example in Section I). The column’s top four cells report a vertically stacked
2 × 2 contingency matrix, consisting of the joint binary distribution of subjects who
favor an option in the choice question and those who favor it in the SWB question.
Looking at these four cells, we point out two facts that illustrate this section’s two
main findings. First, the top two cells reveal that the SWB response is highly predictive of the choice response: between the two cells, 87 percent of respondents rank
Option 1 versus Option 2 in the choice question the same as they do in the SWB
question. Second, the next two cells reveal systematic differences across the two
questions among the remaining 13 percent of respondents: while 12 percent rank
Option 1 (sleep) above Option 2 (income) in the SWB question and reverse this
ranking in the choice question, only 1 percent do the opposite. This asymmetry
suggests that on average, respondents react to the two questions systematically differently. The fifth cell reports the p-value from a Liddell exact test, a nonparametric,
equality-of-proportions test for paired data (Liddell 1983). The null hypothesis—
namely, that the proportion of respondents who rank Option 2 above Option 1 is the
same across the choice and the SWB questions—is easily rejected.
Examining the top five rows in Table 2 for the rest of the Denver columns verifies that the two main findings above are not unique to Scenario 1: in the remaining five scenarios, 81 to 90 percent of respondents rank the two options identically
across the choice and SWB questions; yet in four out of five cases, choice-SWB
reversals among the remaining 10 to 19 percent of respondents are asymmetric,
and the equality-of-proportions null hypothesis across the two questions is easily
rejected. In these cases, respondents rank income above legacy, concert above duty,
low rent above short commute, and income above friends in higher proportions in
the choice question than in the SWB question. There appears to be a systematic
15
Nonresponse in our surveys was generally low. In the Cornell studies, virtually all questions had a nonresponse rate below 2 percent (one Cornell respondent was excluded due to obvious confusion with instructions). In
the CNSS, fewer than 5 percent of respondents answered “Do not know” or refused to answer in any of the questions. Due to the less-structured recruiting method used in our Denver doctor’s office studies, some questions from
those studies had nonresponse rates as high as 20 percent. However, the majority of this nonresponse is driven by
respondents being called in for their appointments, alleviating concerns of selection bias. Comparing the completed
responses of subjects who did not finish the survey to the responses of those who finished the entire survey, we find
no evidence of a difference in average responses.
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Table 2—Choice and SWB Responses across Studies and Scenarios (within-subject data)
Denver
Choice scenario

Higher SWB: Option 1
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 2
Chosen: Option 2
Higher SWB: Option 2
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 1
Chosen: Option 2
p-value from Liddell Exact Test

1

3

4

11

12

13

CNSS
1

Sleep
versus
income
%

Abs. inc.
versus
relative
income
%

Legacy
versus
income
%

Concert
versus
duty
%

Low rent
versus
short
commute
%

Friends
versus
income
%

Sleep
versus
income
%

58

48

24

16

52

50

74

29

42

60

65

32

34

18

1

6

2

12

11

2

1

12

4

14

7

5

14

7

0.000
n = 425

0.350
n = 420

0.000
n = 422

0.024
n = 422

0.002
n = 425

0.000
n = 422

0.000
n = 972

1
Sleep
versus
income
%

2
Concert
versus
birthday
%

Cornell
3
Abs. inc.
versus
rel. inc.
%

4
Legacy
versus
income
%

5
Apple
versus
orange
%

Higher SWB: Option 1
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 2
Chosen: Option 2
Higher SWB: Option 2
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 1
Chosen: Option 2

29

29

41

Version 2
44

45

46

49

43

31

50

1

7

14

8

2

23

15

2

17

3

Indifference for SWB

8

14

13

10

37

0.000
n = 397

0.002
n = 368

0.000
n = 375

0.001
n = 387

0.424
n = 270

6

7

8

9

10

Money
versus
time
%

Socialize
versus
sleep
%

Family
versus
money
%

Education
versus
social life
%

Interest
versus
career
%

44

62

68

53

27

Choice scenario

p-value of Liddell Exact Test

Cornell
Choice scenario

Higher SWB: Option 1
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 2
Chosen: Option 2
Higher SWB: Option 2
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 1
Chosen: Option 2

37

15

15

22

35

14

17

5

22

3

5

6

12

3

35

Indifference for SWB

22

10

5

6

6

0.000
n = 333

0.000
n = 385

0.001
n = 409

0.000
n = 402

0.000
n = 402

p-value of Liddell Exact Test

Notes: Response distribution by study and scenario. For the complete text of each scenario, see the online Appendix.
If a scenario’s phrasing changed meaningfully between surveys, the version of the scenario is indicated in the first
row of the study block. The Liddell Exact Test is a paired equality-of-proportions test of the null hypothesis that
mean response to choice question = mean response to SWB question. In the Cornell data, where respondents could
indicate SWB indifference, responses indicating indifference were dropped before conducting the test.
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tendency among respondents to favor money in the choice question more than in
the SWB question, a point we return to below. (The results for the absolute versus
relative income scenario are discussed below.)
Similarly, the CNSS column suggests that, qualitatively, Scenario 1’s findings carry
over from our Denver study—a pencil-and-paper survey with six-point response
scales administered to a convenience sample—to the CNSS study—a telephone survey with binary response scales administered to a nationally representative sample.
While the proportion of participants with no choice-SWB reversals increases to 92
percent, almost all of the rest—7 out of the remaining 8 percent—favor Option 1
(sleep) in the SWB question and Option 2 (income) in the choice question. The
direction of this asymmetry is, hence, the same as in the Denver sample, and equality of proportions is again easily rejected.
Last among our within-subject data, results from the Cornell surveys are reported
in the bottom section of Table 2. The structure of this portion of the table is similar to
the corresponding Denver and CNSS portions, with the following three differences
that result from the fact that the Cornell questionnaires allow for an additional “no
difference” response in the SWB question: (a) an additional row below the top four
rows reports the proportion of respondents who choose the “no difference” response;
(b) the top four rows report vertically stacked contingency matrices as before, only
here they exclude these “no difference” responses (their sum is normalized to 100
percent); and (c) the “no difference” responses are excluded from the Liddell tests.16
Starting again with Scenario 1 in the left-most column, choice-SWB reversals (in
the third and fourth rows, 24 percent together) are still a minority, although they are
almost twice to three times more common in the Cornell sample than in the Denver
and CNSS samples. Nonetheless, consistent with the Denver and CNSS data, in
virtually all of these reversals—23 of the 24 percent—Option 1 (sleep) is ranked
above Option 2 (income) in the SWB question and below it in the choice question.
Equality of proportions is, again, strongly rejected for this scenario.17
Moving to the rest of the Cornell columns reveals a similar story. Equality of proportions is strongly rejected for all the remaining nine scenarios (2–10) as well, with
the exception of Scenario 5. Recall that we constructed Scenario 5 (“apple versus
orange”) as a falsification test, where—barring problems with our methods—choice
and SWB should largely coincide. The results support this prediction. Indeed, only
5 percent of responses exhibit reversals in this scenario, by far the lowest fraction
among the ten scenarios. Furthermore, we find no evidence that these reversals are
in one systematic direction.18 As to the two other scenarios that are used in both the
16
The distribution of choice-responses among individuals indicating “no difference” for SWB mirrors the distribution of choice-responses among the rest of the respondents reasonably closely (BHKR Table A5), and, hence,
the choice proportions in Table 2 are virtually unaffected by excluding these individuals. Note that, under the null
hypothesis that choice is determined solely by predicted SWB, the distribution of choice-responses should be closer
to 50-50 for individuals indicating SWB “no difference.” Hence, the responses of these respondents actually provide
additional suggestive evidence against the null hypothesis.
17
Comparing each of the top four cells in the Scenario 1 column across the three within-subject samples reveals
that the reported proportions differ dramatically between the samples. Given the very different populations and, in
the CNSS study, the very different survey methods, this finding in itself is not surprising. (For example, we speculate that since a telephone survey is harder to understand, more respondents answered the two questions in the same
way, taking the “artificial consistency” mental shortcut discussed in Section IIB below.)
18
At the same time, a sizeable 37 percent of respondents indicate “no difference” in the SWB question in
Scenario 5—by far the highest. This may suggest that Scenario 5 is “cleaner” than we intended it to be: not only
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Denver and Cornell studies—Scenarios 3 and 4—choice-SWB reversals maintain
their direction: in both studies, (absolute) income is ranked above relative income
(Scenario 3) and above legacy (Scenario 4) in the choice questions more often than
in the SWB questions. While equality of proportions is rejected in the Cornell data
but not in the Denver data in Scenario 3, it is rejected in both studies in Scenario 4.
Finally, in Scenarios 6 and 8, which are used only in the Cornell studies and
include a “money” option, we once again find that respondents favor money in the
choice question more than in the SWB question. That this tendency holds in all
seven scenarios that trade off more money/income for something else—be it more
sleep, higher relative income, a legacy, a shorter commute, being around friends,
having more time, or visiting family—suggests that predicted SWB understates the
weight of money and income in hypothetical choice.19 Of course, predicted SWB is
not the same as experienced SWB, and hypothetical choice is not the same as incentivized choice. Nevertheless, unless the difference between those gaps is sufficiently
negatively correlated with the systematic gap we find between hypothetical choice
and predicted SWB, our results suggest that survey measures of experienced SWB
do not fully capture the weight of money and income in choice.
Our two main findings—that the ranking of the two options is identical across
the choice and SWB questions for most respondents and in most scenarios, but that
respondents react to the two questions systematically differently—hold not only in the
pooled data, but also for each SWB question variant (i)–(v) separately. We show this
in BHKR Table A4, which reports versions of Table 2 by SWB measure. Interestingly,
we find some differences across the measures in the prevalence of choice-SWB reversals. In the Denver sample, the life satisfaction question variation (i) comes closest
to matching choice, with only 11 percent reversals, averaged across all scenarios. In
comparison, happiness with life as a whole (ii) and felt happiness (iii) yield more
reversals—17 percent each. In the Cornell sample, own happiness with life as a whole
(iv) and immediately felt own happiness (v) both yield 22 percent reversals. We return
to the comparison between different SWB measures in Section VA below.
B. Between-Subjects Results
Our within-subject analysis above is based on both choice and SWB responses
elicited from each individual. However, empirical work that uses SWB data relies
on surveys that measure SWB alone, not together with choice. Thus, two potential biases could compromise the relevance of our findings to existing SWB survey
data and their applications. On the one hand, asking a respondent both questions
might generate an “artificial consistency” between the two responses. For example,
respondents might think they ought to give consistent answers, or might give consistent answers as an effort-saving mental shortcut. On the other hand, an “artificial
inconsistency” bias is also possible if respondents infer from being asked more than

non-SWB aspects of life, but even own happiness is deemed by many respondents irrelevant in what they may
perceive as a context of de gustibus non est disputandum.
19
Reassuringly, this tendency in our data is consistent both with the data of Tversky and Griffin (2000) and Hsee
et al. (2003), who use a scenario similar to our Scenario 3 (absolute income versus relative income), and with their
psychological theories (e.g., “lay rationalism”) mentioned in footnote 7.
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one question that they ought to give different answers, or if the presence of the other
question focuses respondents’ attention on the contrast between the wordings.
To assess these concerns, we compare the above results from the Denver and
Cornell within-subject studies with their counterpart between-subjects studies, in
which respondents are asked only the choice or only the SWB question. Three of the
six Denver scenarios analyzed above, and all ten of the Cornell scenarios, are repeated
with identical wording in their between-subjects counterparts (see Table 1). Across
these 13 comparable scenarios and including only the within-subject respondents
who faced the SWB measure used in the between studies (i.e., variant (i) in Denver
and (iv) in Cornell), the median within-versus-between absolute difference in the
proportion of respondents favoring each option is 5 percentage points in the choice
question (a statistically significant difference in two scenarios) and is 8 percentage
points in the SWB question (statistically significant in four scenarios).20 Overall,
then, the within and between response distributions sometimes differ. Moreover, the
direction of the differences in the choice compared to the SWB data suggests that,
on average, artificial inconsistency might indeed explain some of the choice-SWB
reversals in the within data: in the within data, the average choice-SWB difference
in proportions is 10.8 percentage points; in the between data, it is 7.4 percentage
points—about two-thirds of the within difference.
While differences in proportions between choice and SWB are on average of
smaller magnitudes in the between data, they remain sufficiently large to yield
statistical results comparable to those in the within data. In the between data, we
can reject the null hypothesis of no difference between choice and SWB proportions in four scenarios, which is fewer than in the within data discussed in Section
IIA. However, one important reason is that, mechanically, the unpaired test on the
between data has much less statistical power than the paired test on the within data:
even with an equal number of respondents, each responds to only one question
instead of two, and we cannot partial out correlated individual effects on choice and
SWB in analyzing the between data. To compare the within and between data controlling for power differences, we “unpaired” our within data, matched sample sizes
as closely as possible, and simulated unpaired equality-of-proportion tests that treat
these data as if they were between data. We find that we can reject the no-difference
null in four scenarios, exactly the same as what we find using the between data.
Our overall interpretation is that while there are differences across the betweenand the within-subject studies—in particular, choice-SWB reversals are on average
less pronounced in the between-subjects studies—either set of studies supports our
two main findings.

20
Using Fisher tests and a 5 percent significance level, we reject the null hypothesis that equal proportions
choose Option 2 in the within and between data for the Denver sleep versus income scenario (1) and the Cornell
interest versus career scenario (10). We reject the null hypothesis that equal proportions anticipate higher SWB
under Option 2 in the within and between data for the Denver friends versus income scenario (13) and the Cornell
money versus time, education versus social life, and interest versus career scenarios (6, 9, and 10). We report the full
details of the between-subjects data analysis, including all the relevant distributions and statistical tests mentioned
in this subsection, in BHKR (Section IIB, Table 2, and Table A4).
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C. Measurement Error
Our analysis above suggests that in many scenarios, individuals do not respond
to the choice and SWB questions as if they were responding to the same question.
However, in a given scenario, such rejection of the null hypothesis could be explained
by differences in measurement error across the two questions—for example, because
it is easier to introspect about choice than about SWB, or vice versa. An individual
whose “true” ranking of the options is identical across the questions is more likely to
mistakenly rank the “wrong” option higher in a question with greater measurement
error, leading to ranking proportions closer to 50–50 for that question.
Looking across Table 2’s columns reveals that cross-question differences in the
measurement error for choice and SWB in the same direction in all scenarios in a
study cannot explain our data. For example, in the Denver data, choice proportions
are closer to 50–50 in Scenarios 1, 11, and 13, but SWB proportions are closer to
50–50 in Scenarios 4 and 12.
To summarize, the two main findings in this section are (a) that most respondents
in most scenarios do not exhibit choice- versus SWB-ranking reversals, and (b) that
when they do, their pattern of reversals is systematic. Overall, the two findings hold
up well—although with differences in relative strength—across scenarios, populations, and designs. Furthermore, these findings cannot be explained by a measurement error structure that is stable across scenarios.
III. Do Other Factors Help Predict Choice, and by How Much?

In this section we ask: Can we identify other factors that help explain hypothetical choices, controlling for predicted own SWB? We also analyze to what extent
respondents’ choices in our data can be explained by their predicted SWB and other
aspects of life together, compared with their predicted SWB alone.
We address these questions using data from the Cornell sample, where we ask
respondents to rank the options on a set of 11 additional aspects of life, in addition
to ranking them on choice and own SWB (see Section IC). Specifically, in addition
to being asked about “your own happiness,” respondents are also asked about: your
family’s happiness, your health, your romantic life, your social life, your control
over your life, your life’s level of spirituality, your life’s level of fun, your social
status, your life’s nonboringness, your physical comfort, and your sense of purpose.
While still a limited list, it is intended to capture “functionings” proposed by economists and philosophers (Sen 1985; Nussbaum 2000); nonhedonic and eudaimonic
components of well-being proposed by psychologists (e.g., White and Dolan 2009)
that are not fully captured by measures of SWB (Ryff 1989); as well as other factors
that we thought might matter for choice besides own happiness.
The design of our Cornell between-subjects surveys allows us to also elicit withinsubject data from our 201 participants. This is done by presenting subjects with
the between-subjects part of the survey, followed by an additional, within-subject
part.21 When discussing the between-subjects results in Section IIB we used only
21

To be specific, we present the entire sequence of ten scenarios three times. First, each scenario is presented and
is followed by only a choice question (for half the respondents) or only a SWB question (for the other half). Second,
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data from the first, between-subjects part. In contrast, in this section we pool data
from both parts, treating them as within-subject data. Further pooling these data
with the original Cornell within-subject data (432 respondents) yields an augmented
sample of 633 Cornell within-subject respondents, which we analyze here. As we
report in Section IV, our main results hold in the constituent subsamples.
A. Response Distributions
Figure 1 displays, by scenario, the histograms of raw, multipoint responses to
the choice, (own) SWB, and 11 other aspect questions. Note first that the choice
responses—and also the SWB responses, although to a lesser extent—tend to be
bimodal with most of the mass on “definitely” or “probably,” suggesting that the
choice-SWB reversals discussed in Section II are not the result of widespread
near-indifferences. Second, notice that we were rather successful in constructing
Scenario 5 (apple versus orange): almost everyone indicates “no difference” in the
bottom 11 cells in this column. While 37 percent also indicate “no difference” on
SWB, the low count of reversals in Scenario 5 suggests that for the other respondents, variation in choice is strongly related to variation in SWB. Finally, note that in
many other scenarios, there is substantial variation in the 11 other aspect rankings,
and that the histogram of choice responses sometimes looks rather different from the
histogram of SWB responses.
B. Explaining the Variation in Choice
Table 3 presents a variety of specifications in which we regress choice on SWB and
other aspects of life, aggregating data across the ten scenarios (we discuss regressions by scenario in Section VB below). We want to estimate the relationship from
the within-scenario—rather than the between-scenario—variation in responses. For
this purpose, in the probit and ordered probit specifications, we include scenario
fixed effects. In the OLS specifications, we demean all variables at the scenario level.
Doing so yields coefficients identical to those in a fixed-effects OLS specification,
but has the advantage that the R2s reflect only the within-scenario explanatory power
of the regressors.
The first column of Table 3 reports an OLS regression of six-point choice on
seven-point SWB. The R2 shows that 0.38 of the variation in choice is explained by
own happiness alone. In comparison, a regression of the same choice measure on
our 11 other aspects (each as a seven-point variable) yields an R2 of 0.21 (second
column of Table 3). Hence, we find that own SWB predicts choice substantially better than all of the other aspects combined. In the third column we regress choice on
both own SWB and the 11 other aspects. The R2 of 0.41 is substantially higher than

after respondents finish answering that question for each of the ten scenarios, the ten scenarios are presented again,
each followed by only the question (SWB or choice) respondents had not seen yet. Finally, the ten scenarios are
presented for a third time, with each scenario followed by the 11 additional questions about other aspects of life.
Respondents are specifically instructed to answer the surveys in exactly the order questions are presented, and the
experimenters verify that they do (in the rare cases where a respondent was observed to flip through the pages, she/
he was promptly reminded of this instruction). With this design, excluding data collected after the first round of
scenario-presentation yields between-subjects data.
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Figure 1. Raw Response Distributions (Choice and Aspects of Life)
Notes: Based on 633 Cornell respondents. The histograms show the distribution of six-point responses to the choice
question (top row) and seven-point responses to the aspect questions (bottom 12 rows). The left-most column
aggregates data across choice scenarios; each of the other columns corresponds to a specific scenario.

that in the second column but is only slightly higher than that in the first column.22
The pattern in these three columns is similar when we relax the linear functional
form, replacing each regressor with a set of six dummy variables (not reported).
In summary, when we pool data across scenarios we find that adding 11 additional
aspects to the regression of choice on own SWB increases explanatory power, but
the increase is rather modest. (The increase is substantial, however, in some of the
individual scenarios, as we report in Section VB.)
C. Comparing the Coefficients
In order to compare and interpret the coefficients in Table 3, we assume that
hypothetical choices in our data can be represented as maximizing a utility function
U(H(X), X), where H is own SWB and X is a vector of other factors that might
affect choice both directly and indirectly through H.23 If people choose what they
think would maximize their SWB alone (as opposed to trading off their SWB for
22
Bootstrapped standard errors yield the following 95 percent confidence intervals around the three respective
R2s: [0.36, 0.40], [0.19, 0.23], and [0.39, 0.43].
23
For a more thorough treatment of our empirical framework within this simple model, see BHKR.
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Table 3—Regressions of Choice on Aspects of Life
OLS
Measurement error
correction
Own happiness

None

None

0.54***
(0.009)

Ordered Probit

Probit

None

SIMEX
corrected
additive

None

None

SIMEX
corrected
additive

0.46***
(0.010)

0.59***
(0.014)

0.37***
(0.009)

0.37***
(0.012)

0.48***
(0.019)

Family happiness

0.15***
(0.017)

0.08***
(0.015)

0.11***
(0.026)

0.06***
(0.012)

0.09***
(0.017)

0.13***
(0.032)

Health

0.07***
(0.021)

0.00
(0.019)

0.00
(0.031)

0.01
(0.016)

0.01
(0.022)

0.02
(0.042)

Life’s level of romance

−0.00
(0.024)

−0.01
(0.021)

0.01
(0.033)

−0.00
(0.018)

−0.00
(0.025)

0.04
(0.045)

Social life

−0.01
(0.020)

−0.03*
(0.018)

−0.05*
(0.028)

−0.02
(0.015)

−0.02
(0.021)

−0.04
(0.036)

Control over your life

0.17***
(0.017)

0.08***
(0.015)

0.11***
(0.025)

0.06***
(0.012)

0.09***
(0.017)

0.13***
(0.028)

−0.08***
(0.024)

−0.02
(0.021)

−0.04
(0.036)

−0.02
(0.018)

−0.04
(0.025)

−0.05
(0.047)

Life’s level of fun

0.13***
(0.021)

0.05**
(0.018)

0.03
(0.031)

0.04**
(0.015)

0.04**
(0.021)

0.03
(0.036)

Social status

0.07***
(0.016)

0.06***
(0.014)

0.07***
(0.023)

0.05***
(0.012)

0.07***
(0.016)

0.10***
(0.027)

Life’s nonboringness

0.07***
(0.020)

0.00
(0.014)

0.00
(0.020)

0.01
(0.037)

Physical comfort

0.09***
(0.017)

0.04***
(0.014)

0.03
(0.023)

0.04***
(0.012)

0.05***
(0.017)

0.04
(0.030)

Sense of purpose

0.21***
(0.015)

0.12***
(0.013)

0.13***
(0.022)

0.10***
(0.011)

0.12***
(0.015)

0.14***
(0.025)

6,217
0.21

6,217
0.41

6,217

6,217
0.19

6,217
0.35

6,217

Life’s level of spirituality

Observations
(pseudo) R2

6,217
0.38

−0.01
(0.017)

−0.01
(0.030)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. In the OLS and ordered probit regressions, the dependent variable is six-point
choice. In the probit regressions the dependent variable is binary choice. All regressions use seven-point ratings of
aspects. Based on 633 Cornell respondents. Each observation is a respondent’s choice and aspect ratings for one scenario; there are ten observations per respondent corresponding to the ten scenarios in the questionnaires. Probit and
ordered probit regressions include (unreported) scenario fixed effects. OLS regressions’ variables are demeaned at the
scenario level, generating coefficients equivalent to those generated by including scenario fixed effects. Measurement
error corrections are done using the Simulation-Extrapolation method described in Section III, under the assumption of additive measurement error. Observations with missing data in any variable are excluded from all regressions.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.

other factors), then the (vector) partial derivative ∂U/∂X will be identically zero. To a
first-order approximation, this would require that all 11 coefficients other than that on
own happiness in Table 3’s third column be zero—a hypothesis we can easily reject
(F-test p < 0.0001). This result is robust to treating the choice measure as ordinal or as
binary (Table 3’s fifth and sixth columns); to relaxing the linearity of our SWB measure
by replacing it with a set of six dummy variables; and to combinations of these specifications. Furthermore, with the exception of Scenario 8 (where F-test p = 0.086), the
result holds in each individual scenario.24 All this suggests that not all the marginal
utilities ∂U/∂X are zero, even if the first-order approximation is imperfect.
24

See Tables A7–A10 in BHKR for these and other specifications. Table A10 shows that this result holds by
scenario even when the regressions include only aspects for which more than a trivial fraction of respondents (e.g.,
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Moving from testing the null hypothesis to interpreting the magnitudes of coefficients requires additional assumptions—both standard econometric assumptions and
psychological ones. Econometrically, for example, if X includes aspects we did not
measure, the coefficients might be biased due to omitted variables. Psychologically,
the coefficients are comparable only if respondents respond to the seven-point scales
similarly across the 12 aspects.
Comparing the coefficients in the third column of Table 3, the coefficient on own
happiness is by far the largest. A one-point increase in our seven-point measure of
predicted SWB is associated with a highly significant 0.46-point increase in our sixpoint choice measure. After own happiness, the largest coefficients are on sense of
purpose (0.12), control over one’s life (0.08), family happiness (0.08), and social
status (0.06). The relative sizes of the coefficients are similar in alternative specifications (e.g., the ordered probit column), but remember that the data are pooled
across surveys that use two opposite orders in which aspects are presented, and
order matters for the coefficient estimates (see Section IV). While the rejection of
∂U/∂X = 0 suggests that own SWB is not the only argument in the “hypotheticalchoice utility function,” a comparison of the coefficients suggests that the marginal
utility of own happiness is several times larger than the marginal utilities of even the
most significant among the other aspects we measure.25
D. Measurement Error
Measurement error in our measures of own happiness and the other aspects will bias
the coefficient estimates and potentially also invalidate our test of the null hypothesis
∂U/∂X = 0. In order to address these concerns, we collected repeated observations
on a subsample (of 230) of our Cornell respondents. This enables us to estimate measurement-error-corrected regressions. In particular, we use Simulation-Extrapolation
(SIMEX) (Cook and Stefanski 1994), a semi-parametric method that assumes homoskedastic, additive measurement error but does not make assumptions about the distribution of the regressors.26 As shown in Table 3, relative to the OLS results, the SIMEX
coefficient on own happiness increases and remains by far the most predictive regressor. However, the other aspects with largest coefficients and statistical significance in
the OLS regressions remain statistically significant and also increase, suggesting that
our main results in this section are not due to measurement error.

15 percent) indicate answers other than “no difference.” In other words, it holds even when we include only the most
reliably estimated coefficients. Interestingly, Table A10 shows that the only large and robust non-SWB coefficient
in the “apple versus orange” scenario is that on “physical comfort”; this seems consistent with the de gustibus
interpretation of this scenario.
25
However, we believe that the most plausible bias from unmeasured factors exaggerates the coefficient on own
happiness. In particular, an unmeasured factor whose effect on H has the same sign as its direct effect (i.e., not
through H) on U will bias upward the coefficient on own happiness.
26
Intuitively, the SIMEX method proceeds in two steps. First, it simulates datasets with additional measurement
error and uses them to estimate the function describing how the regression coefficients change with the amount of
measurement error. Then the algorithm extrapolates in order to estimate what the coefficients would be if there were no
measurement error in the original data. We choose this method over several more common measurement error correction methods (such as IV or regression disattenuation) for several reasons. Primarily, the other methods are much less
efficient in this setting. Moreover, the SIMEX method is flexible in its treatment of the measurement error structure, it
accommodates misclassified categorical data, and it easily accommodates nonlinear models such as probit or ordered
probit regressions. For additional discussion of SIMEX see BHKR, and for IV results, see Table A12 there.
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IV. Robustness

To examine the robustness of our results from Sections II and III, we conduct
a long list of additional analyses. Full details, including all tables and statistics,
are reported in BHKR. In this section we briefly summarize our findings. Unless
stated otherwise, they are based on our within-subject data from either the Denver
or Cornell samples.
Are Results Driven by Only a Few Individuals?—We find that most respondents
(both in Denver and Cornell) exhibit at least one reversal and that very few exhibit
reversals in half or more of the scenarios. Moreover, to explore whether some of
the respondents who do not exhibit a choice-SWB reversal in a given scenario
would have done so if that scenario’s trade-off between SWB and other factors had
assigned a different “price” to SWB, some Denver respondents face three versions of
Scenario 4 (legacy versus income), with three different income levels in the income
option (see details in the online Appendix). Ninety-one percent of these respondents
monotonically rank the income option higher in both choice and SWB as the amount
of income increases. Of those, 22 percent exhibit a choice-SWB reversal for at least
one income level, compared to an average of 12 percent reversals at a given income
level. This suggests that the fraction of reversals we observe in other scenarios is a
lower bound on the fraction who would exhibit a reversal in those scenarios with
some “price of SWB.”
Scenario-Order Effects and Participant Fatigue.—We investigate the effects of
scenario order on responses with our Denver sample, where respondents face the six
scenarios in one of two opposite orders (see Table 1). Scenario-order effects could
arise, for example, due to increasing fatigue or boredom among respondents. While
we indeed find evidence of scenario-order effects on response patterns, they do not
systematically affect the degree of choice-SWB concordance we find.
Respondents’ Explanations for their Choice-SWB Reversals.—After our Cornell
respondents finish responding to all the decision scenarios, we directly ask all of
them additional questions, including: whether any choice-SWB reversals they might
have made were a mistake (only 7 percent respond “Yes”); whether they think they
would regret any choice-SWB reversal they might have made (23 percent respond
“Yes”); and whether they were trying to make their choice and SWB responses
consistent (20 percent respond that they were). Our results from Section III remain
largely the same when the analysis excludes groups of respondents based on their
responses to these questions. We also ask respondents to explain their reasoning for
any choice-SWB reversals, and we view the resulting qualitative data as roughly
consistent with our main results.27

27
For example, many respondents mention trade-offs between their own happiness and the happiness of family
and friends, or mention trade-offs between short-lived happiness and goals such as long-term career success. The
full text of these responses is included with the rest of the data, and is available online.
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Self-Control.—To assess whether choice-SWB reversals merely reflect a selfcontrol problem (as in Laibson 1997), in addition to asking participants what they
would choose, we also ask some of them what they would want themselves to choose
(the meta-choice question mentioned in Section IC). Aggregating across all surveys
that include the meta-choice question (see Table 1), we find reversals between choice
and meta-choice in 28 percent of the cases. While self-control problems may be relevant in these cases, our main conclusions from Section III are robust to either excluding
these observations or to replacing choice with meta-choice as the dependent variable.
Context of Choice, SWB, and Other-Aspect Questions.—Respondents’ interpretations of the questions or their understanding of the meaning of the related concepts
may be context dependent.28 As mentioned in Sections I (see Table 1) and III, different versions of our surveys vary in whether the choice and SWB questions are asked
close together or far apart, and in the order the questions are asked; they also vary
in the distance between own happiness and the other 11 aspects, and in the order
of the aspects. Repeating our analysis in Section III by questionnaire organization
indicates that order and context effects do indeed matter. For example, aspects listed
earlier have larger coefficients, and own happiness as part of a 12-aspect list has a
smaller coefficient than as a stand-alone question. Yet, in all designs, aspects other
than own happiness are statistically significant, and the coefficient on own happiness
has the highest point estimate among the aspects.
V. Heterogeneity in Choice-SWB Concordance

We have thus far focused on characterizing the average concordance between our
choice and SWB measures. However, the averages mask substantial heterogeneity: across our questionnaires (see Table 1) and scenarios, choice-SWB coincidence
ranges from well below 50 percent to above 95 percent. To provide information that
may be useful for researchers and policymakers, we conduct our main analysis separately across SWB measures, scenarios, and respondent characteristics. This section
briefly summarizes a more thorough treatment in BHKR.
A. Comparing SWB Measures
We compare how well our different SWB question variants predict choice by comparing R2s from univariate OLS regressions of our multiple-point choice variable on
each of our multiple-point SWB measures. As in Section III, we demean our variables at the scenario level. In the Denver sample, the life satisfaction question variant (i) is the best predictor of the choice question, with R 2 = 0.65. Happiness with
life as a whole (ii) and felt happiness (iii) come second and third, respectively, with
R 2 = 0.59 and 0.55. The felt happiness R 2 is statistically significantly lower than
the life satisfaction R 2 ( p = 0.02 calculated using bootstrapped standard errors),
and the R 2 for happiness with life as a whole is not statistically distinguishable
28
Notice the important difference between this possibility and the possibility of cross-respondent differences in
the interpretations or understanding of the scenarios. The latter possibility is a lesser concern as long as a respondent’s interpretation or understanding of a scenario remains the same across the choice and SWB questions.
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from the other two. In the Cornell sample, own happiness with life as a whole (iv)
and immediately felt own happiness (v) have R 2 = 0.39 and 0.37, not statistically
distinguishable from each other.
These R2s and our findings in Section IIA paint a consistent picture. While in the
Denver data the life-satisfaction-type SWB question is more predictive of choice
than the happiness-type SWB questions, in both Denver and Cornell the felt happiness and the happiness with life as a whole questions predict choice similarly. On
the evaluative-versus-affective spectrum of SWB measures (see Section IC), these
results lend partial support to the notion that more evaluative measures may generate
rankings more similar to hypothetical choice.29
B. Comparing Scenarios
For applied work, it is useful to know in which situations the assumption that
people’s choices maximize their predicted SWB is a better or worse approximation. Table 4 shows the benchmark OLS specification from Table 3, conducted separately for each of the ten scenarios in the Cornell data. The “Incremental R 2” row
reports the difference between the R2s from the reported multivariate regressions
and R2s from univariate regressions of choice on only own happiness (which are
not reported).
As discussed above, Scenario 5 (apple versus orange)—which was designed
to minimize choice-SWB reversals—has little variance in aspects other than own
SWB and the fewest reversals (see Figure 1 and Table 2). As expected, the R 2 in a
univariate regression of choice on SWB is the highest (at 0.56) in Scenario 5, and
the incremental R 2 from adding all other aspects is the lowest (at 0.02). If this type
of minor decision—which possibly comprises most decisions in life—generally
features low variance in aspects other than own SWB, then the assumption that
people’s choices maximize their predicted SWB might be a good approximation
in such settings.
Interestingly, at the other extreme, the four scenarios we designed to be representative of typical important decisions (see Section IB) facing our college-age Cornell
sample—Scenarios 7–10 (socialize versus sleep, family versus money, education
versus social life, and interest versus career)—are among the scenarios with the
lowest univariate R 2 and, correspondingly, the highest incremental R 2. Indeed, in
Scenarios 7 and 10, where univariate R 2 is the lowest—at 0.25 and 0.24, respectively—incremental R 2 is 0.07 and 0.13. Here, the additional 11 aspects increase
predictive power (as measured by R 2) substantially, by 28 and 54 percent. This,
in turn, suggests that one should be especially cautious in assuming that people’s
choices maximize their predicted SWB in empirical applications that focus on
important life decisions.

29

One possible hypothesis as to why some SWB measures are better predictors of choice is that they induce
participants to more accurately report the present value of instantaneous SWB flows over time. Our data do not
allow us to directly test this hypothesis because we have no direct evidence on how respondents aggregate SWB
over time. However, our finding that variant (v)—about happiness “in the few minutes immediately after making
the choice”—is as predictive of choice as variant (iv)—about happiness in “life as a whole”—seems inconsistent
with this view.
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Table 4—OLS Regressions of Choice on All Aspects of Life, by Scenario
Choice scenario

Own happiness
Family happiness
Health
Life’s level of romance
Social life
Control over your life
Life’s level of spirituality
Life’s level of fun
Social status
Life’s nonboringness
Physical comfort
Sense of purpose
Observations
R2
Incremental R2

1

2

3

4

5

All
scenarios
pooled

Sleep
versus
income

Concert
versus
birthday

Abs. inc.
versus
rel. inc.

Legacy
versus
income

Apple
versus
orange

0.46***
(0.010)
0.08***
(0.015)
0.00
(0.019)
−0.01
(0.021)
−0.03*
(0.018)
0.08***
(0.015)
−0.02
(0.021)
0.05**
(0.018)
0.06***
(0.014)
−0.01
(0.017)
0.04***
(0.014)
0.12***
(0.013)

0.38***
(0.031)
0.07**
(0.032)
−0.05
(0.055)
0.08
(0.059)
−0.02
(0.055)
0.02
(0.042)
−0.04
(0.049)
0.06
(0.042)
−0.00
(0.036)
0.05
(0.037)
0.09**
(0.036)
0.17***
(0.038)

0.44***
(0.031)
0.01
(0.071)
−0.07
(0.076)
−0.02
(0.064)
0.02
(0.043)
0.05
(0.053)
−0.00
(0.061)
0.15***
(0.051)
0.04
(0.045)
−0.03
(0.054)
0.00
(0.060)
0.12***
(0.047)

0.52***
(0.032)
0.16***
(0.046)
−0.11
(0.077)
0.07
(0.078)
−0.01
(0.056)
0.04
(0.056)
−0.16*
(0.090)
0.04
(0.066)
0.05
(0.040)
0.22***
(0.078)
−0.05
(0.054)
0.12***
(0.044)

0.44***
(0.031)
0.05
(0.041)
−0.04
(0.058)
−0.00
(0.066)
0.00
(0.058)
0.08**
(0.039)
0.13**
(0.055)
0.05
(0.047)
0.04
(0.036)
−0.01
(0.047)
0.00
(0.042)
0.12***
(0.041)

0.73***
(0.036)
0.16
(0.159)
0.05
(0.065)
−0.67***
(0.228)
0.02
(0.225)
−0.00
(0.093)
0.31
(0.221)
−0.08
(0.127)
−0.27
(0.227)
0.09
(0.121)
0.21***
(0.066)
0.29**
(0.119)

6,217
0.41
0.03

615
0.46
0.06

621
0.43
0.03

620
0.53
0.04

624
0.41
0.04

624
0.58
0.02
(Continued)

The rest of the scenarios lie somewhere in between. They include the scenarios
that were designed to explore common themes from the happiness literature and,
surprisingly, those designed as situations where we most expected to find tensions
between SWB and other factors.
C. Comparing Respondents
Across the Denver, CNSS, and Cornell samples, we find relatively little evidence
for differences in the frequency of choice-SWB reversals across demographics that
include gender, age, race, education, and income, with the exception that in the
Cornell sample, black respondents are more likely than others to exhibit reversals.
In the Cornell within-subject sample, we measured the “Big 5” personality traits
using John and Srivastava’s (1999) BFI scale. We find that a one–standard deviation
increase in conscientiousness is associated with a 2 percent lower likelihood of a
reversal, while a one–standard deviation increase in neuroticism (i.e., moody, tense)
is associated with a 2 percent higher likelihood of a reversal.
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Table 4—OLS Regressions of Choice on All Aspects of Life, by Scenario (Continued)
Choice scenario

Own happiness
Family happiness
Health
Life’s level of romance
Social life
Control over your life
Life’s level of spirituality
Life’s level of fun
Social status
Life’s nonboringness
Physical comfort
Sense of purpose
Observations
R2
Incremental R2

6

7

8

9

10

Money
versus
time

Socialize
versus
sleep

Family
versus
money

Education
versus
social life

Interest
versus
career

0.53***
(0.036)
0.15**
(0.059)
0.06
(0.075)
−0.10
(0.086)
0.04
(0.071)
0.07
(0.052)
−0.15
(0.091)
0.13*
(0.068)
−0.01
(0.061)
−0.03
(0.060)
−0.00
(0.049)
0.05
(0.050)
619
0.42
0.02

0.31***
(0.032)
−0.09*
(0.053)
0.18***
(0.054)
0.02
(0.054)
−0.00
(0.065)
0.15***
(0.043)
−0.01
(0.076)
−0.03
(0.073)
0.06
(0.059)
0.18***
(0.062)
0.05
(0.048)
0.04
(0.044)
622
0.32
0.07

0.53***
(0.033)
0.05
(0.050)
0.05
(0.057)
−0.03
(0.068)
−0.05
(0.053)
0.05
(0.049)
−0.15**
(0.062)
0.03
(0.059)
0.11*
(0.060)
−0.05
(0.061)
−0.10**
(0.041)
0.09**
(0.046)
625
0.38
0.02

0.35***
(0.029)
0.14***
(0.037)
−0.03
(0.044)
0.01
(0.053)
−0.04
(0.053)
0.06
(0.038)
−0.00
(0.054)
0.06
(0.057)
0.06*
(0.029)
−0.02
(0.055)
0.06
(0.040)
0.17***
(0.037)
626
0.43
0.08

0.27***
(0.030)
0.21***
(0.041)
−0.06
(0.063)
0.01
(0.072)
0.01
(0.054)
0.07**
(0.035)
−0.01
(0.068)
−0.00
(0.057)
0.16***
(0.043)
0.05
(0.055)
−0.02
(0.049)
0.17***
(0.029)
621
0.37
0.13

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions of six-point choice on seven-point aspects of life. Based on 633
Cornell respondents. The left-most column aggregates data across choice scenarios; each of the other columns corresponds to a specific scenario. Each observation is a respondent’s choice and aspect ratings for one scenario; there are
ten observations per respondent corresponding to the ten scenarios in the questionnaires. All variables are demeaned
at the scenario level. “Incremental R2” is the difference in R2 between the reported multivariate regression and a univariate regression of choice on own happiness; it represents the increased percentage of variation in choice that can
be explained by including the additional aspects. Observations with missing data in any variable are excluded from
the regression.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.

VI. Discussion

Throughout this paper, we have remained agnostic as to which survey question,
if any, best elicits a person’s preferences.30 However, if one assumes that hypothetical choices reveal preferences, our results could help in reconciling two opposing
theoretical views regarding the relationship between SWB data and preferences.
30
Note that while economists often assume that incentivized choice reveals preferences, which in turn defines economic welfare, psychologists instead often equate experienced SWB with welfare (see, e.g., Kahneman, Wakker, and
Sarin 1997). Taking this latter perspective, Hsee (1999) and Hsee et al. (2003) interpret reversals between hypothetical choice and predicted SWB as evidence of mistakes in choice behavior. For careful discussions of the appropriate
notion of welfare, see, e.g., Tversky and Griffin (2000); Loewenstein and Ubel (2008); and Fleurbaey (2009).

VOL. 102 NO. 5

BENJAMIN ET AL.: WOULD YOU CHOOSE WHAT WOULD MAKE YOU HAPPIEST?

2107

The first, reflected at least implicitly in much of the economics of happiness literature, is that SWB data represent idealized revealed-preference utility in the sense
of what individuals would choose if their predictions of the SWB consequences of
their choices were not biased. The second view, explicitly laid out in, e.g., Kimball
and Willis (2006) and Becker and Rayo (2008), is that even well-informed agents
will be willing to trade off SWB for other things they care about, making SWB and
preferences distinct. Our results suggest that people do not seek to maximize SWB
exclusively, at least as it is currently measured, but that SWB is a uniquely important
argument of the utility function.
Since hypothetical choices maximize predicted SWB (especially “life satisfaction”) for most of our respondents in most of our scenarios, our results might be
interpreted as comforting for applied researchers who use SWB as a proxy for utility. We caution that the amount of choice-SWB concordance we find overstates the
justification to treat SWB as a proxy for utility; applications always require additional assumptions that we do not test. For example, typical assumptions are that
SWB measures are comparable and can be aggregated across individuals.31
When comparing scenarios, our results suggest that, first, researchers should be
especially cautious when interpreting SWB data as indicating what well-informed
individuals would choose in settings that are perceived by those individuals to
involve personally important decisions. Second, in settings where one alternative
involves higher income or more money, our survey respondents are systematically
more likely to choose the money alternative than they are likely to predict it will
yield higher SWB. Unless this systematic gap is sufficiently negatively correlated
with the difference between the predicted-experienced SWB gap and the hypothetical-incentivized choice gap, this finding in turn suggests that the increasingly
common practice of estimating implicit willingness to pay for nonmarket goods by
comparing the coefficient on income with that on another variable in multivariate
SWB regressions may bias these estimates upwards relative to incentivized choice–
based estimates.
Our scenario-based methodology could be usefully applied in several new directions. First, the method of assessing choice-SWB correspondence could be used to
assess new SWB measures that might predict hypothetical choice better than existing SWB measures. Our findings suggest that responses to existing measures do
not fully capture the weight that factors such as sense of purpose have in explaining
choice. Additionally, existing SWB measures may primarily reflect current feelings,
rather than also reflecting anticipated future SWB flows. In BHKR we describe pilot
data we collected on two novel measures aimed at addressing these issues, neither
of which appears to predict choice any better than existing measures. Nonetheless,
developing new measures seems an especially promising area for further research.32
31
Our results may also overstate the extent to which standard SWB questions provide a good measure of preferences because standard questions are asked absolutely (“How satisfied are you with your life?”), while our SWB
questions are asked relatively (“Between these two options, which do you think would make you more satisfied with
life?”). Different individuals may apply different scales to a greater extent for an absolute measure, making it more
difficult to translate an absolute SWB measure into a meaningful utility number than might be suggested by our results.
32
Since different SWB questions seem to capture distinct dimensions of well being that correlate differently
with income and other variables (e.g., Kahneman and Deaton 2010), future research could also explore whether a
combination of SWB questions predicts choice better than any individual SWB question alone (including ladder- or
mountain-type SWB questions, which we do not study in this paper).
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Second, our method could be used to provide more tailored guidance for applied
work by asking about scenarios that are intended to address specific issues of interest.
To illustrate this point, we pilot four such scenarios at the end of our Cornell repeatsurvey. For example, to reconcile the intuition that Americans today are better off
than in the past with the finding that average SWB has remained flat in the United
States over the past decades (Easterlin 1974, 1995; see Stevenson and Wolfers 2008
for a recent assessment), we ask respondents to rank being born in 1950 versus being
born in 1990 in both choice and SWB questions. Although our respondents overwhelmingly favor being born in 1990 in both questions, more choose 1990 despite
believing that they would be happier in 1950 than the reverse. This result indeed
suggests that some people prefer being born later even if it does not make them
happier. For another example, to reconcile the intuition that expanding political and
economic freedoms for women have made women better off with the finding that
average SWB among women has declined in the United States since the 1970s, both
absolutely and relative to men (Stevenson and Wolfers 2009), we ask respondents to
rank living in a world with or without these expanded freedoms for women. Again,
significantly more respondents choose a world with these expanded freedoms for
women in spite of believing that a world without them would make them happier
than the reverse. For further examples and full details, see BHKR.
Finally, some researchers have attempted to identify the key non-SWB aspects
of life that are associated with greater welfare (e.g., Sen 1985). Others have called
for an SWB-based “national well-being index” to provide a measure of welfare that
captures factors not represented in economic indicators such as GDP (e.g., Diener et
al. 2009). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to empirically
estimate weights on SWB and other factors in a way that might be useful for combining them into an overall index for predicting what individuals themselves would
choose. If hypothetical choices are assumed to reveal preferences that are relevant
for evaluating welfare, then our method could be applied more systematically for the
purpose of developing a well-being index.
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